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INSURER MISCONDUCT AND THE WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACT: WILL THERE
BE A REMEDY?
I. INTRODUCTION
The workers' compensation system, both in Oklahoma and in other
states, is designed to provide immediate benefits to the injured worker in
an effort to prevent financial destitution and undue hardship on the part
of the worker and his family.' To be eligible for workers' compensation
benefits, the worker must prove only that he was injured on the job and
that the injury occurred in the course of his employment.2
Although many of the injuries suffered on the job in Oklahoma each
year are job-related, insurance companies3 will prematurely terminate or
refuse to ever begin benefits due under the Act.4 By terminating benefits,
they can force the injured worker from a bad situation in to what soon
becomes a desperate one.5 The worker may face a delay of several
months before receiving his benefits.6 In the months that intervene, he
1. The Oklahoma Supreme Court states as follows:
The intention of [the workers' compensation acts], therefore, is to prevent workmen and
their dependents from becoming objects of charity by affording reasonable compensation
for all such calamities as are incidental to hazardous employment. Injury to the employee
is now, therefore, no longer regarded as the result of negligence, but as the necessary prod-
uct of industry, and, as such, to be compensated by the industry.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Cruce, 129 Okla. 60, -, 263 P. 462, 464 (1928).
2. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 3(7) (1981 & Supp. 1986). Many injuries which occur are with-
out question covered under the Workers' Compensation Act [hereinafter the Act]. This comment
will deal with the conduct of the insurer/employer associated with the provision of benefits in a
situation where the injury is unquestionably compensable.
3. Here and throughout this Comment, the terms "employer" and "insurer" or "insurance
company" will be used interchangeably. For purposes of this Comment, these usually distinct enti-
ties operate jointly or in the same capacity to provide benefits to the injured worker.
4. See, e.g., Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 448 N.E.2d 866 (Ill. 1983) (insurance company
paid benefits until statute of limitations ran then terminated them despite plaintiff's ongoing inability
to work); Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 2d 615, 273 N.W.2d 220 (1979) (benefits
to injured employee arbitrarily terminated three times despite uncontradicted evidence that he was
unable to work).
5. A worker injured between 1986 and 1987 could draw a maximum temporary total disability
benefit of $217.00 per week. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 22(6) (1981 & Supp. 1985). This amount
represents two thirds of a state employee's weekly wages. No matter what the worker was paid on
the job, he can only receive two thirds of his weekly wage up to a maximum of $217.00 per week. In
many working families, this cut in income is enough to throw an already tight budget into disarray.
At higher income levels, it forces a substantial drop in the standard of living. When the benefits are
terminated while the worker is still disabled, a desperate search for money begins.
6. If a request for hearing was filed in October 1987, it would be two to four months before a
1
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must have money for food, housing, utilities. Faced with this situation,
the worker may be willing to compromise his claim and any future
claims that he might have for the promise of a quick settlement.
Through this technique, the insurance company may potentially save it-
self thousands of dollars.'
Should the injured worker hold on until he receives a hearing, no
independent remedy is provided to him for this tactical termination of
benefits. The monies that will be received are merely those to which he
would have been entitled anyway, along with a surcharge which may or
may not be assessed by the judge.' There is no compensation for the
humiliation suffered by the worker who has been forced in the interim to
hearing is granted on the issue of temporary total disability; hearings for permanent disability take
from four months to a year. Telephone interview with Michael Clingman, administrator of the
Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court (Oct. 1987).
7. Settlement offers made to unrepresented claimants are generally made on what is termed a
joint petition settlement (final settlement) as provided under OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 84 (1981). When
a claimant settles by joint petition, it acts as a final settlement and he has, in effect, given up any
rights he might have to later reopen his case, to claim rehabilitative services, or for job placement
services. See id. at §§ 16, 28. The insurance company has thus spared itself the threat of future
claims for this injury. Otherwise, it might look forward to paying for another operation on the
claimant's back, along with additional temporary total disability benefits and/or permanent disabil-
ity benefits.
8. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 22(5) (1981 & Supp. 1987) provides:
If any compensation payments owed without an award are not paid within ten (10)
days after becoming due there shall be added to such owed payments an amount equal to
ten percent (10%) of the amount due which shall be paid at the same time in addition to
the owned payments unless such nonpayment is excused by the Court after a showing by
the employer that conditions exist over which the employer had no control in that either
payments were not made within the prescribed time or the employer denies coverage
within the time specified for the employer to respond.
Id.
If the benefits wrongfully terminated are for permanent partial disability awarded by the court,
then OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, §§ 41-42 (1981 & Supp. 1987) apply. Section 41 provides, in pertinent
part, that
[flailure for ten (10) days to pay any final award or any portion thereof, as ordered shall
immediately entitle the beneficiary to an order finding the respondent and/or insurance
carrier to be in default and all unpaid portions, including future periodic installments un-
paid, shall immediately become due and may be immediately enforced as provided by Sec-
tion 42 of this title.
Section 42 provides that the court may certify the order to the district court clerk for entry as a
judgment on the judgment docket to be collected through the district court. Payments so ordered
bear an interest rate of eighteen percent per annum. The statute further provides for revocation of
the license of an insurer who "intentionally, knowingly, or willfully violates any of the provisions of
the Workers' Compensation Act." Id.
These penalties do not constitute a "remedy" to the injured worker. In the case of the ten
percent assessed for termination of the payment of temporary total disability, this amount can be
equated with a payment of interest, the rate of which would vary depending upon how long payment
was withheld. The eighteen percent payable on permanent disability awards is designated as interest
by the statute, again not constituting a true penalty. Interest is not a penalty, but is the sum paid for
the temporary use of someone else's money. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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and those in which the insurer's misconduct occurs after the injury, pro-
ducing a second injury or loss. 16 Larson's theory recognizes that the ini-
tial on-the-job injuries and the subsequent mental injuries inflicted by
insurer misconduct are separate causes of action and should be treated as
such. Where the conduct precedes the injury, any injuries are assumed
to merge together and thus bar a separate cause of action for the con-
duct.17 However, where the conduct is post-accident, a second separate
injury results. Particularly when the second injury is non-physical, the
majority of decisions have allowed the claimant a cause of action in dis-
trict court, as well as recovery through workers' compensation."8 In
cases where there is also a physical component to the second injury, re-
covery may be allowed if the physical component is only an element of
damages. The main thrust of the action must be for a non-physical in-
jury with any physical injury being a by-product.19 Whether an action is
barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of workers' compensation act,
then, depends both upon the legal ingredients, which differ in each juris-
diction, and the results of the tortious act.
Larson applied his "second injury" analysis to Unruh2" and, in a
better-reasoned approach, reached the same conclusion as the California
court.21 In Unruh,2 2 there were indeed two injuries: the back injury and
the mental breakdown. The tort alleged by Unruh in the common law
action was separate from the original workers' compensation injury. The
tort did not in any way contribute to the job-related injury and occurred
many months after the physical injury. By recognizing this emotional
injury as a "distinct event," the court specifically placed it outside the
16. LARSON, supra note 9, at § 68.32. In this section, Larson addresses the tort of deceit, but
his arguments are equally applicable to other torts arising from the conduct of the employer or
insurer.
17. Id.
18. Id. at § 68.32(b). This section pertains to a non-physical injury in the form of impairment
of legal rights, but the arguments made in favor of allowing district court pursuit of this cause of
action are equally persuasive for other non-physical injuries.
19. Id. at § 68.33. Larson states that "[i]f the essence of the wrong, then is personal injury or
death, and if the usual conditions of coverage are satisfied, the action must be barred by the exclu-
siveness clause no matter what its name or technical form may be." Id. at § 68.34(a). He reaches
the following conclusion:
If the essence of the tort, in law, is non-physical, and if the injuries are of the usual non-
physical sort, with physical injury being at most added to the list of injuries as a make-
weight, the suit should not be barred. But if the essence of the action is recovery for
physical injury or death, the action should be barred even if it can be cast in the form of a
normally non-physical tort.
Id.
20. Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1972).
21. LARSON, supra note 9, at § 68.34(b).
22. Unruh, 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1972).
1988]
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realm of workers' compensation. Unruh's breakdown, then, did not arise
"out of and in the course of the employment, ' 23 and was neither covered
nor barred by the exclusive remedies of the compensation act. Using a
"but-for" approach, the second injury is related to the compensable job-
related injury, but this approach cannot justify placement of the second
injury within the workers' compensation act. To view the second injury
in this way would set a precedent which could lead to unjustifiable
results.24
C. Application of the Larson Approach
Applying Larson's second injury theory, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court allowed an injured worker a cause of action for bad faith. In Cole-
man v. American Universal Insurance Co.,25 the insurer cut off the plain-
tiff's benefits three times while it was in possession of uncontradicted
medical reports showing that the plaintiff was unable to work. The court
held that under these circumstances the acts by the insurer constituted a
separate tort independent of the workers' compensation act, and there-
fore was not barred by the exclusive remedy provisions.26 Using Lar-
son's analysis, the court held that the exclusive remedy provision applied
only if an injury fell within the coverage of the act.27 As Coleman's in-
jury was a second injury not arising from his employment, it was not
covered by the act. Therefore, the cause of action was allowed. With
this promising beginning, the stage was set for decisions of the courts in
the 1980s.
23. California's statute uses language identical to that of OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 3(7) (1981 &
Supp. 1986), which requires that a compensable injury must arise out of and in the course of
employment.
24. This reasoning could indeed lead to untenable results in Larson's estimation:
To say that the second injury was only an aggravation or extension of the first, because the
investigation was related to the first injury, one would have to accept a kind of but-for
theory that could lead to preposterous results. It is true that but for the original injury the
investigation would never have been undertaken and the second injury would not have
occurred. But must we go on to say that the carrier acquires complete tort immunity ever
after for anything its agents do to carry out their investigation?... Is the compensation act
the exclusive remedy, merely because the activity involved, which was the collecting of
evidence, was in the mainstream of the agent's duties?
LARSON, supra note 9, at § 68.34(b). Larson feels that these questions demand a negative answer.
25. 86 Wis. 2d 615, 273 N.W.2d 220 (1979).
26. The plaintiff alleged "Itihat these tactics of harrassment [sic] and delay were meant to cause
the plaintiff to give up on his claims, to minimize the amount of the defendants' liability or to cause
the [plaintiff] to starve." Id. at -, 273 N.W.2d at 221. The court held that "where a worker's
compensation insurer acts in bad faith in the settlement or payment of compensation benefits, a
separate tort is committed that is not within the purview of the exclusivity provisions of the workers'
compensation law. .. ." Id.
27. Id. at -, 273 N.W.2d at 222.
[Vol. 23:511
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beg for loans from relatives and friends, or for the goods he had to sell at
less than a fair price for much-needed cash.9 Justice demands that some
remedy be available to the injured worker treated so outrageously by the
insurance company. Tort actions for bad faith and intentional infliction
of emotional distress are becoming increasingly numerous as more
abused claimants seek to gain remedies for such conduct through the
district courts.
II. THE EARLY CASES
State and federal district courts have reached different conclusions
regarding the availability of a common law remedy for the injured
worker in cases of bad faith or intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Although most courts have focused on the language of the state's work-
ers' compensation statutes, the injury caused by the failure to pay bene-
fits is not the injury intended to be covered by the compensation act, but
is a second injury to the employee. This second injury is generally non-
physical, distinguishing it from the initial, job-related injury. As a sec-
ond injury, it falls outside the workers' compensation laws because it did
not arise out of and in the course of the employment. Although the vari-
ous workers' compensation acts do not address these injuries, the major-
ity of courts have traditionally looked to the compensation acts.
A. Judicial Attempts to Create a Remedy
A cause of action for an employer's intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress upon an injured worker was first recognized by the Massa-
chusetts federal district court. In Cohen v. Lion Products Co.,1 ° the estate
of a deceased worker claimed that the employer had tormented the
worker with threats of a lay off. The claimant was laid off and died two
weeks later from a massive heart attack due to emotional distress.1" The
court reasoned that this tort was not the kind of personal injury covered
by the workers' compensation act,1 z because the act was intended to
9. "Embarrassment, humiliation, and deprivation of personal liberty... were not the sort of
'personal injuries' contemplated by the Act." 2A A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
§ 68.31 (1987) [hereinafter LARSON].
10. 177 F. Supp. 486 (D. Mass. 1959).
11. Id. at 488.
12. The court reasoned as follows:
Presumably the reason why those torts [libel, false arrest] are excluded, is because the
policy, history, administrative mechanism, and scale of the Workmen's Compensation Act
show that it covers bodily injury, apprehension of bodily injury, and perhaps even mental
1988]
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cover only injuries arising out of an in the course of employment. Be-
cause no remedy was afforded by the compensation act, the court in Co-
hen allowed the estate a cause of action at common law. It held the tort
to be a "mental" one regardless of the obviously physical result of the
stress. Despite its findings, the court granted summary judgment for the
defendants, holding that the stated claims did not survive the worker's
death. Thus, Cohen offers no guidance because the portion of the opin-
ion dealing with the common law tort is dicta.
The California Supreme Court was next to deal with the issue of
common law damages in the workers' compensation context. In Unruh
v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 3 two investigators employed by the work-
ers' compensation insurance carrier were assigned to Unruh, an injured
worker who had undergone four back operations. One of the investiga-
tors befriended her, inviting her to behave in ways that exceeded her
physical capacities. While she was involved in these activities, the other
investigator filmed her. At a later hearing in her workers' compensation
case, the films were shown, and Unruh realized for the first time the true
nature of her relationship with the investigator. After suffering a physi-
cal and mental breakdown, she brought suit, alleging intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.
Based on the dual capacity doctrine, 4 the California court decided
to allow a common law cause of action in order to further the objectives
of the compensation act, and to encourage the insurer to carry out its
proper duties in the legislative scheme." Therefore, the plaintiff had a
viable cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
B. Larson's Approach
Professor Larson, a recognized authority in the area of workers'
compensation, analyzes insurer misconduct by distinguishing between in-
juries subsequent to and somehow caused by the insurer's misconduct,
impairment, but not injury to feelings or emotions apart from fright of physical conse-
quences.... [T1here is not a "personal injury" compensable under the . . . Workmen's
Compensation Act.
Id. at 489.
13. 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1972).
14. The employer or insurer otherwise immune to suit by the injured employee may lose this
immunity if the injury occurred while it was involved with the employee in some other capacity. For
example, the employer may lose his immunity to suit if he was acting in the capacity of landowner at
the time of the injury to the employee. The insurer is more likely to lose its immunity that is the
employer under this doctrine. The doctrine has now largely fallen into disfavor with the courts. See
generally LARSON, supra note 9, at §§ 72.81, 72.92.
15. Unruh, 7 Cal. 3d at -, 498 P.2d at 1073, 102 Cal. Rptr. at -.
[Vol. 23:511
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and those in which the insurer's misconduct occurs after the injury, pro-
ducing a second injury or loss. 16 Larson's theory recognizes that the ini-
tial on-the-job injuries and the subsequent mental injuries inflicted by
insurer misconduct are separate causes of action and should be treated as
such. Where the conduct precedes the injury, any injuries are assumed
to merge together and thus bar a separate cause of action for the con-
duct."7 However, where the conduct is post-accident, a second separate
injury results. Particularly when the second injury is non-physical, the
majority of decisions have allowed the claimant a cause of action in dis-
trict court, as well as recovery through workers' compensation."' In
cases where there is also a physical component to the second injury, re-
covery may be allowed if the physical component is only an element of
damages. The main thrust of the action must be for a non-physical in-
jury with any physical injury being a by-product.19 Whether an action is
barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of workers' compensation act,
then, depends both upon the legal ingredients, which differ in each juris-
diction, and the results of the tortious act.
Larson applied his "second injury" analysis to Unruhz" and, in a
better-reasoned approach, reached the same conclusion as the California
court.21 In Unruh,2 there were indeed two injuries: the back injury and
the mental breakdown. The tort alleged by Unruh in the common law
action was separate from the original workers' compensation injury. The
tort did not in any way contribute to the job-related injury and occurred
many months after the physical injury. By recognizing this emotional
injury as a "distinct event," the court specifically placed it outside the
16. LARSON, supra note 9, at § 68.32. In this section, Larson addresses the tort of deceit, but
his arguments are equally applicable to other torts arising from the conduct of the employer or
insurer.
17. Id.
18. Id. at § 68.32(b). This section pertains to a non-physical injury in the form of impairment
of legal rights, but the arguments made in favor of allowing district court pursuit of this cause of
action are equally persuasive for other non-physical injuries.
19. Id. at § 68.33. Larson states that "[i]f the essence of the wrong, then is personal injury or
death, and if the usual conditions of coverage are satisfied, the action must be barred by the exclu-
siveness clause no matter what its name or technical form may be." Id. at § 68.34(a). He reaches
the following conclusion:
If the essence of the tort, in law, is non-physical, and if the injuries are of the usual non-
physical sort, with physical injury being at most added to the list of injuries as a make-
weight, the suit should not be barred. But if the essence of the action is recovery for
physical injury or death, the action should be barred even if it can be cast in the form of a
normally non-physical tort.
Id.
20. Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1972).
21. LARSON, supra note 9, at § 68.34(b).
22. Unruh, 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d 1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815,(1972).
1988]
7
et al.: Insurer Misconduct and the Workers' Compensation Act: Will There
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1987
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
realm of workers' compensation. Unruh's breakdown, then, did not arise
"out of and in the course of the employment, '23 and was neither covered
nor barred by the exclusive remedies of the compensation act. Using a
"but-for" approach, the second injury is related to the compensable job-
related injury, but this approach cannot justify placement of the second
injury within the workers' compensation act. To view the second injury
in this way would set a precedent which could lead to unjustifiable
results.24
C. Application of the Larson Approach
Applying Larson's second injury theory, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court allowed an injured worker a cause of action for bad faith. In Cole-
man v. American Universal Insurance Co.,25 the insurer cut off the plain-
tiff's benefits three times while it was in possession of uncontradicted
medical reports showing that the plaintiff was unable to work. The court
held that under these circumstances the acts by the insurer constituted a
separate tort independent of the workers' compensation act, and there-
fore was not barred by the exclusive remedy provisions.21 Using Lar-
son's analysis, the court held that the exclusive remedy provision applied
only if an injury fell within the coverage of the act.27 As Coleman's in-
jury was a second injury not arising from his employment, it was not
covered by the act. Therefore, the cause of action was allowed. With
this promising beginning, the stage was set for decisions of the courts in
the 1980s.
23. California's statute uses language identical to that of OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 3(7) (1981 &
Supp. 1986), which requires that a compensable injury must arise out of and in the course of
employment.
24. This reasoning could indeed lead to untenable results in Larson's estimation:
To say that the second injury was only an aggravation or extension of the first, because the
investigation was related to the first injury, one would have to accept a kind of but-for
theory that could lead to preposterous results. It is true that but for the original injury the
investigation would never have been undertaken and the second injury would not have
occurred. But must we go on to say that the carrier acquires complete tort immunity ever
after for anything its agents do to carry out their investigation?... Is the compensation act
the exclusive remedy, merely because the activity involved, which was the collecting of
evidence, was in the mainstream of the agent's duties?
LARSON, supra note 9, at § 68.34(b). Larson feels that these questions demand a negative answer.
25. 86 Wis. 2d 615, 273 N.W.2d 220 (1979).
26. The plaintiff alleged "[tihat these tactics of harrassment [sic] and delay were meant to cause
the plaintiff to give up on his claims, to minimize the amount of the defendants' liability or to cause
the [plaintiff] to starve." Id. at -, 273 N.W.2d at 221. The court held that "where a worker's
compensation insurer acts in bad faith in the settlement or payment of compensation benefits, a
separate tort is committed that is not within the purview of the exclusivity provisions of the workers'
compensation law. .. ." Id.
27. Id. at -, 273 N.W.2d at 222.
[Vol. 23:511
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B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Another avenue of potential recovery for the worker in cases of in-
surer misconduct is the claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. 9 While the conduct necessary to constitute a cause of action may
vary from state to state, generally three elements must be present: (1) an
intentional act, (2) which was unreasonable, and (3) which the actor real-
ized was likely to cause an injury.' Proof of these elements may allow
the injured worker a cause of action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress.
In Robertson v. Travelers Insurance Co.,4 the Illinois Supreme
Court decided that even where an insurer failed to inform a claimant of
his right to file a workers' compensation claim, no claim for outrageous
conduct could succeed. The carrier paid for plaintiff's medical care for
his on-the-job accident until the statute of limitations for filing of a com-
pensation claim had expired. It then informed plaintiff that it was termi-
nating all benefits, forcing the plaintiff to borrow money from friends and
seek public aid. Plaintiff then filed a compensation claim which was met
with a statute of limitations defense by the insurer. The Industrial Com-
mission determined that the insurer's conduct estopped it from raising
the statute of limitations defense and awarded compensation.
Robertson filed suit in district court, alleging that the financial
strain and borrowing humiliated him and affected him both mentally and
emotionally.42 He won at the trial court level, but the Illinois Supreme
Court overturned the verdict, holding that the action was barred by the
exclusive remedy provision.43 This decision was based on the court's
reading of the statutory language of the Illinois compensation act.' The
39. The claim in Vantine v. Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co., 762 F.2d 511 (7th Cir. 1985) was a hybrid
which alleged that the insurance company also behaved outrageously.
40. See, eg., Bennett v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 549 P.2d 393, 397 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
41. 95 Ill. 2d 441, 448 N.E.2d 866 (1983).
42. Id. at -, 448 N.E.2d at 869.
43. Id. at , 448 N.E.2d at 870. The court adopted the majority view and defined the rationale
behind those cases as follows:
The rationale of these cases [denying a common law action] has typically been that the
legislature, anticipating that bad faith in delaying payment of benefits would occur on occa-
sion, provided a "quick, simple and readily accessible method" of resolving disputes over
such payments without "the proof and defenses incident [to a common law action), the
intolerable delay in resolution of a lawsuit, economic waste to all and expense to the
worker" or the spectre of "multiple jurisdictions being engaged in the resolution of the
same basic questions with the possibility of conflicting results."
Id. at -, 448 N.E.2d at 870. (citations omitted).
44. Ia at -, 448 N.E.2d at 870. Unlike the Oklahoma exclusive remedy provision, the Illinois
statute prohibited tort actions even in cases of intentional misconduct by the employer/insurer.
1988]
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court decided that the exclusive remedy provision meant that the benefits
provided to the claimant were to be his only remedy against the compen-
sation insurance carrier.45 Implicitly, the court's decision to bar the
claim rested on the degree of outrage claimed and the fact that the stat-
ute of limitations had not been allowed to bar the claim.
In the past two years, Kentucky has also attempted to establish a
policy dealing with insurer misconduct. In Zurich Insurance Co. v.
Mitchell,46 the Kentucky Supreme Court held that there was no cause of
action for bad faith or outrage based on failure to timely pay benefits.
The plaintiff was a worker adjudged to be one hundred percent perma-
nently disabled. While the order of the compensation court provided
that medical treatment was to continue, the carrier stopped payment,
forcing plaintiff to return to the court in order to obtain payment for his
medical treatment. The plaintiff sued for bad faith and outrage.
The court reasoned that the torts of outrage and bad faith simply
did not apply in this case because the worker's compensation act pro-
vided several remedies for bad faith conduct by the insurer.47 However,
the court then implicitly contradicted itself, distinguishing bad faith from
the tort of outrage. In the case of outrage, the court felt that if the em-
ployer/insurer's conduct were "conspicuously contemptible," a cause of
action would be allowed.48 The circumstances in this case were simply
not extreme enough to justify a cause of action under the tort of out-
rage.49  Citing the underlying purpose of the exclusive remedies provi-
sion, the court held that the workers' compensation remedies were
45. Id at -, 448 N.E.2d at 871.
46. 712 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. 1986).
47. Id. at 341. "[The Act] provides several safeguards to insure that alleged misconduct or
delay in payment by an employer or its insurance carrier can be presented quickly and appropriate
relief granted... by the [Workers' Compensation] Board ...." Id.
48. The court made the following statement:
The typical case in which courts have permitted a former employee to maintain a tort
action against the employer involved circumstances in which the employer or the insurance
company's conduct was "conspicuously contemptible." ... A claimant cannot elevate a
simple delay in payments into an actionable tort merely by using the terms fraudulent,
deceitful and intentional. The exclusive remedy provided by the statute is not voided by
the employer's violations because... [it] provides a remedy for untimely or delayed pay-
ments and the legislature has specified that the only exception to the exclusive remedy is
for the willful and unprovoked physical aggression.
Id. at 342.
49. The court also made note of the following:
The Mitchell complaint alleges only the untimely payment of some medical expenses under
a compensation award. Neither the insurance companies nor the employer caused his reg-
ular disability payments to be terminated. No one harassed, threatened or even contacted
him. There were no timely steps taken to petition the Board or circuit court for the en-
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intended to be exclusive." Recent Kentucky case law has not clarified
this position. 1
C. Decisions Allowing a Cause of Action
Other courts, however, have been presented with circumstances of
misconduct which have justified a common law remedy. In a case from
South Dakota before the Eighth Circuit, the court found that plaintiffs
established a cause of action for bad faith. 2 The injured worker began
suffering side effects from exposure at work to the chemical toluene.53
After filing a compensation claim, she was awarded benefits by the work-
ers' compensation court. Without legal basis, the insurer appealed the
plaintiff's claim twice, despite instructions from the home office to pay
her. Plaintiff sued, alleging intentional, malicious, and fraudulent acts on
the part of the insurer. Focusing on the fact that the injury complained
of occurred after the work-related injury, the court held that the worker's
compensation statute did not cover torts which arose independent of the
compensable injury.54
In 1985, the federal district court of Delaware adopted the reasoning
of the Eighth Circuit. In Correa v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers Associa-
tion Insurance Co., two injured workers and one spouse brought an
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress and bad faith. Even
though the initial injuries were admittedly work-related, 6 the insurance
carrier routinely refused to pay or delayed in making payment on medi-
cal bills, causing the plaintiffs to be sued by the medical creditors, and
ruining their credit rating. Plaintiffs filed suit, claiming bad faith and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The Delaware court held that the emotional distress caused by the
50. Id. at 341.
51. See, eg., Coker v. Daniel Constr. Co., 664 F. Supp. 1079 (W.D. Ky. 1987) (false affidavits
filed by defendant insurance company combined with failure to pay benefits as ordered are not
enough to state a tort cause of action).
52. Hollman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 712 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1983).
53. Toluene is clear, colorless, noncorrosive liquid which may be either inhaled as a vapor or
absorbed through the skin. It may cause irritations to the eyes, respiratory tract, and skin. Ex-
tended contact can result in dermatitis. If an individual is acutely exposed to toluene, central ner-
vous system depression results, with symptoms of headache, dizziness, lack of coordination, skin
paresthesias, collapse, and coma. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, OCCUPA-
TIONAL DISEASES: A GUIDE TO THEIR RECOGNITION at 242-44 (rev. ed. 1977).
54. Hollnan, 712 F.2d at 1261. The court also relied on the analysis of Professor Larson, supra
notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
55. 618 F. Supp. 915 (D. Del. 1985).
56. Id. at 917.
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creditor's suit was a separate injury which did not arise out of employ-
ment or include physical injuries which were the subject of the workers'
compensation claims. 7 Thus, the exclusive remedy provision of the
compensation act did not apply to bar the plaintiff's claims.5" The court
also extended the remedies afforded the injured worker for intentional
infliction of emotional distress to the spouse.59 Several other states have
since followed suit."0
D. Summary
In all cases, both where a cause of action was allowed and where one
was denied, courts have looked at the specific language of the particular
workers' compensation act in question to determine whether the lan-
guage would support an independent tort claim. In addition, courts have
looked to case law to determine what constitutes a tort cause of action
within that state. Therefore, in order to determine whether such claims
should be allowed in Oklahoma, a thorough analysis of Oklahoma statu-
tory and case law is required.61
57. Id. at 923.
58. Id at 924-25. Later in its opinion dealing with the issue of bad faith, the court states as
follows:
The theoretical foundation upon which these cases rest is the premise that worker's com-
pensation carriers owe a duty of good faith and fair dealing to the employees insured by
their policies and that where an insurance carrier breaches that duty by delaying or termi-
nating worker's compensation benefits owed to an employee, the employee suffers an injury
which does not arise out of the course of his or her employment. Thus, the injury is not
one to which the exclusivity doctrine is applicable.
Id. at 924.
59. Id. at 929. This is a reasonable approach as an insurer must anticipate that the injured
worker may have a family and the spouse is, therefore, a foreseeable victim of the insurer's acts.
60. See, eg., Synder v. Congoleum/Kinder, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (claim for
bad faith dismissed against employer but allowed as to insurance carrier); Carpentino v. Transport
Ins. Co., 609 F. Supp. 556 (D. Conn. 1985) (plaintiff seeking relief for bad faith conduct on part of
insurer has stated a tort separate and apart from any wrong covered by the compensation act and
cause of action will be allowed); Brazier v. Travelers Ins. Co., 602 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ga. 1984)
(cause of action allowed against an insurer for fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, abuse of process, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, holding that such injuries were outside the scope of the
compensation act).
61. The only Tenth Circuit case which deals with this issue is Chavez v. Kennecott Copper
Corp., 547 F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 1977). In this claim for bad faith against the employer, the court held
that no cause of action would stand in view of the workers' compensation settlement made, which
specifically released all claims against the employer. Based on this release, the court held that no
cause of action remained. While this case interpreted the New Mexico workers' compensation act,
the provision of that act are analogous to those of the Oklahoma Act, see OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 84
(1981); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit has implicitly
ruled that an employee may not settle his claim by joint petition and then maintain a common law
action.
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Oklahoma has long recognized the common law tort of bad faith.
In National Mutual Casualty Co. v. Britt,6 2 the Oklahoma Supreme
Court held that the insurer owed a duty of the "utmost good faith" in its
dealings with the insured.6 3 From this decision, a line of cases descended
in which Oklahoma courts recognized the duty of the insurer to the in-
sured and the damages which may be recovered in the event the duty is
breached.
Another Oklahoma landmark case which further explained the duty
of the insurer is Christian v. American Home Assurance Co. 'I The pri-
mary question in Christian was whether there was liability in tort for an
insurance company's malicious, willful, and bad faith refusal to pay a
valid insurance claim.65 The plaintiff had paid premiums on a disability
insurance policy. When plaintiff did in fact become totally disabled, the
insurance company refused to pay the claim. Plaintiff brought an action
in district court, after which he collected the benefits due along with in-
terest. During the course of this trial, it became obvious to the plaintiff
that the insurance company never had defense to his claim. The action
for bad faith followed.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held that a
tort cause of action did exist. The court determined that when a policy
of insurance is made, it imposes a legal duty upon the insurer to act in
62. 203 Okla. 175, 200 P.2d 407 (1948).
63. 203 Okla. at 178-79, 200 P.2d at 411. The court quoted the Vermont case of Johnson v.
Hardware Mut. Casualty Co., 109 Vt. 481, -, 1 A.2d 817, 820 (1938), with approval:
When the company accepted the premium charged for the policy, it impliedly undertook to
use this control and management for the mutual benefit of the parties to the contract.
Their relations became mutually fiduciary; and each owed the other the duty of the utmost
good faith in their dealings together, and in exercising the privileges and discharging the
duties specified in and incident to the policy contract. The plaintiff engaged to cooperate
with the company if a loss threatened. He was bound to do so honestly and with all good
fidelity... . [The company] had a right to look after its own interests, but it was bound to
have due regard for the plaintiff's interests, as well. If in what it did and refused to do, it
acted honestly and according to its best judgment, this suit must fail. If on the contrary, it
used its authority over the case ... to save itself from as much of the loss as possible, in
disregard of the plaintiff's rights, consciously risking loss to the plaintiff to save loss to
itself, the suit must succeed; for that would be bad faith, while its relation to the plaintiff
demanded good faith. . . . [B]ad faith on the part of the defendant would be the inten-
tional disregard of the financial interests of the plaintiff in the hope of escaping the full
responsibility imposed upon it by its policy.
Britt, 203 Okla, at 178-79, 200 P.2d at 411-12.
64. 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977).
65. Id. at 900.
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good faith.66 The Christian court imposed a duty on the insurer not only
to pay in accord with the policy, but also to pay promptly. 67 The court
further stated that when that duty is breached, the injured party may
bring a tort action and possibly recover punitive damages.68 Christian
therefore clarified the duties of the insurer to the insured.69
In 1982, the Oklahoma court extended the boundaries of bad faith
actions. In Timmons v. Royal Globe Insurance Co.,7° the insured brought
suit after a tort action against him resulted in an award which exceeded
his policy limits. He alleged that the insurance company had in bad faith
raised defenses to claims against him and had therefore refused to settle
the suit for a reasonable amount within policy limits.7" Finding a failure
"to deal fairly and in good faith,"' 72 the court held that the plaintiff had
indeed stated a cause of action.
The Timmons73 court also delineated the parties who may be joined
in a bad faith suit. Timmons sought damages against an adjustor, a third
party who was a stranger to the insurance contract. While the third
party was an agent of the insurance company, the court held that a judg-
ment against him as an individual could not be allowed. He had no in-
dependent duty to deal in good faith with the insured and therefore his
misconduct was attributed to the insurance company.74
66. Id. at 901.
67. Id. at 904. However, the court noted that
[r]esort to a judicial forum is not per se bad faith or, unfair dealing on the part of the
insurer regardless of the outcome of the suit. Rather, tort liability may be imposed only
where there is a clear showing that the insurer unreasonably, and in bad faith, withholds
payment of the claim of its insured.
Id at 905. This rule that the plaintiff must prove that the insurer behaved unreasonably and in bad
faith is illustrated by Manis v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 760 (Okla. 1984). In Manis, the
court held that where the insurer could reasonably have drawn the inference that for some reason
the claim put forth was not valid, the fact that the insurer lost the case did not subject him to
punitive damages. This case involved a fire which the fire marshall stated had started from some
flammable material, leading the insurance company to reasonably suspect arson.
68. Christian, 577 P.2d at 901. The court went further, stating that "notwithstanding that it
[breach of good faith] also constitutes a breach of contract," the plaintiff may be allowed to recover
punitive damages in certain instances. This is in contrast to the law of contracts, which does not
impose punitive damages. Id.
69. Id. at 902.
70. 653 P.2d 907 (Okla. 1982).
71. Royal Globe cited a failure to guard the aircraft involved in the action after one of its agents
told Timmons not to worry about protecting it as it had crashed in too remote a location to be
disturbed. The avionics, however, were stolen at which time the insurance company claimed this
defense to the claim. Id. at 910. The company also claimed that Timmons had failed to cooperate
by sending requested documents, when it was established that copies of the documents had been
forwarded by the company to its investigator. Id. at 911.
72. Id. at 914.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 913.
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In 1984, Allstate Insurance Co. v. Amick 7" extended the holding in
Christian. The Amicks, plaintiffs in a suit against an insured of All-
state's, brought suit against Allstate for failure to negotiate a settlement
with them. Although they were not Allstate's insureds, 6 the plaintiffs
attempted to extend the Christian reasoning to include themselves. They
alleged that the insurer had dealt in bad faith with them. The court,
however, rejected this position, stating that Christian applied only to sit-
uations between the insurer and insured and did not extend the duty of
good faith to third parties.77 Thus, Amick effectively limits any possible
action against an insurer to parties who are in privity with the insurer.
In the holdings of these four cases, the parameters of a bad faith suit
have been established by the Oklahoma court. The claim for bad faith
actions may be made by the insured whenever there is an insurance pol-
icy because the policy imposes a duty on the insurer to act in good
faith. 8 This duty requires that the insurer pay a valid claim promptly
and further conduct itself with good faith. 9 Third parties to the contrac-
tual obligations of the insurer may not be sued, 0 nor may they bring suit
against the insurer.8"
B. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
According to Oklahoma case law, an action for mental anguish does
not have to result from a physical injury as long as the act was willful
and violated plaintiff's legal rights.82 In attempts to justify this conclu-
sion, courts have held that the suffering of emotional distress causes a
change in the nervous system and that this is in itself enough to consti-
tute a physical injury for purposes of recovery.83 In Oklahoma, the ele-
ments which must be present to constitute intentional infliction of
emotional distress are (1) an intentional act, (2) which was unreasonable,
75. 680 P.2d 362 (Okla. 1984).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 364-65.
78. Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977).
79. Id. at 904.
80. Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 907, 912 (Okla. 1982).
81. Allstate, 680 P.2d 362, 364..
82. Eddy v. Brown, 715 P.2d 74 (Okla. 1986) (cause of action for outrage would be allowed in
the employment context); Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, 189 Okla. 60, 113 P.2d 190 (1941);
Floyd v. Dodson, 692 P.2d 77 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984); Bennett v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 549
P.2d 393 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975).
83. Bennett, 549 P.2d at 396. The court stated that "[c]ourts have recognized that the interest
in freedom from severe emotional distress is regarded as of sufficient importance to require others to
refraining from conduct intended to evoke it." Id. at 397.
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and (3) which the actor realized was likely to cause an injury.84 Later
case law has changed the second requirement to require more than un-
reasonable conduct; the act must be "extreme and outrageous."8" This
change arose from a belief that more restrictive requirements were neces-
sary to prevent suits alleging minor insult or inconsiderate conduct.
8 6
C. Application of the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Statutes
Courts have discussed several reasons for allowing or disallowing
tort actions against the insurer for bad faith or intentional infliction of
emotional distress. These factors include the language of specific statu-
tory provisions dealing with accidental versus intentional injuries, pen-
alty provisions, and statutory duties imposed upon the defendants.
Courts have also relied on case law to determine the relationships of the
parties: the contractual relationship, if any, of the employee and the in-
surance carrier, and the "agency" between the employer and the insurer.
Oklahoma law leans in support of a cause of action for either bad faith or
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
1. Employees as Insureds
Section 65.3 of Title 85 of the Oklahoma Statutes8 7 provides that the
84. I
85. Floyd, 692 P.2d at 80.
86. In Munley v. ISC Fin. House, Inc., 584 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Okla. 1978), the court modified its
views:
The torts of intentional infliction of mental distress and invasion of privacy are part of a
modem development in the law to afford some redress to plaintiffs who have suffered from
certain previously non-actionable forms of anti-social behavior. Inherent in the develop-
ment of these new forms of action is an attempt to strike a medium between some of the
merely unpleasant aspects of human interpersonal relationships on the one hand and
clearly unacceptable conduct on the other. There is simply no room in the framework of
our society for permitting one party to sue on the event of every intrusion into the psychic
tranquility of an individual. If recovery for damage done is to be afforded at all, there must
be some test by which to weed out those suits premised on mere discord between individu-
als while preserving those where the conduct of individuals has clearly exceeded tolerable
bounds of social deportment... . [For the] defendant's conduct to be actionable as an
intentional infliction of mental distress it must be of such a character as would reasonably
be regarded as "extreme and outrageous."
Id.
87. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 65.3 (1981) provides in pertinent part:
Every contract of insurance issued by an insurance carrier for the purpose of insuring an
employer against liability under the Workers' Compensation Act shall be conclusively pre-
sumed to be a contract for the benefit of each and every person upon whom insurance
premiums are paid, collected, or whose employment is considered or used in determination
of the amount of the premium collected upon such policy for the payment of benefits as
provided by the Workers' Compensation Act regardless of the type of business in which the
employer of such person is engaged or the type of work being performed by the employee
at the time of any injury received by such employee arising out of and in the course of his
employment, which contract may be enforced by such employee as the beneficiary thereof.
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employee is the beneficiary of the contract of insurance between the em-
ployer and insurance carrier. By declaring the injured employee to be
the beneficiary of the contract, the legislature has effectively provided
that the insurer shall act with good faith in its dealing with the injured
employee. Section 65.3 places a legal duty upon the insurer, then, to
conduct itself in good faith. 8 More significantly, the statute provides
that the insurance contract may be "enforced" by the employee. Use of
the word "enforced" generally means that one given this power has the
option of using the courts to claim whatever right is given him.89 This
phrasing of Section 65.3 should allow the employee a tort action.
2. Penalties
Statutory imposition of penalties upon an insurer for failure to
timely pay extends the exclusive remedy of the Workers' Compensation
Acts to matters of misconduct. Many courts have viewed penalties as a
remedy for the injured worker." Therefore, the courts of many states
have relied on the exclusive remedy provision to bar all claims for bad
faith based on statutory penalty provisions. 1 Other state courts have
held that these penalties do not exclude claims for additional damages
under bad faith provisions.92 The Oklahoma Act also includes provi-
sions to ensure payment of compensation benefits, and a closer examina-
tion of those laws will help determine how the Oklahoma courts will rule
in cases of compensation insurer misconduct.
The Oklahoma legislature enacted Section 22(5) 9 3 which provides
"penalties" for non-payment of temporary total disability before the
Id.
88. Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977).
89. "Enforce" is defined as follows: "to make affective as to enforce a particular law" BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 474 (5th ed. 1979).
90. LARSON, supra note 9, at § 69.30.
91. See, ag., Robertson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 95 Ill. 2d 441, -, 448 N.E.2d 866, 869, 871
(1983) (Illinois legislature has provided penalties in the amount of 50% of compensation payable
plus $100 per day until paid) Zurich Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 712 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Ky. 1986) (Kentucky
law provides for 12 percent interest penalty on delayed payments, imposition of fines and imprison-
ment, and all costs against party unreasonable refusing to pay benefits).
92. See, eg., Carpentino v. Transp. Ins. Co., 609 F. Supp. 556, 559 (D.C. Conn. 1985) (provi-
sions made for a penalty of reasonable attorney fees and 6% per annum on unpaid portion); Brazier
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 602 F. Supp. 541, 547-48 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (legislature provided penalties in the
amount of 15% of compensation due unless excused, attorneys fees and costs).
93. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 22(5) (1981 & Supp. 1987). The text of the statute is set out below:
If any compensation payments owed without an award are not paid within ten (10) days
after becoming due there shall be added to such owed payments an amount equal to ten
percent (10%) of the amount due which shall be paid at the same time in addition to the
owed payments unless such nonpayment is excused by the Court after a showing by the
1988]
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claimant prevails in Workers' Compensation Court. These monies may
be assessed if the compensation has not been paid ten days after it is due.
The court may, at its discretion, however, excuse the nonpayment upon a
showing by the employer that he faces circumstances beyond his control
or denies coverage. The Oklahoma Act does not contain provisions re-
garding wrongful termination of benefits ordered paid,94 nor does it cover
bad faith denials of coverage. The employer may escape anything resem-
bling a penalty under the statute simply by timely denial of the claim. In
any event that coverage is timely denied, the employee is left without a
remedy, collecting only the monies initially due even if the employer is
later found to have unreasonably denied the claim. Additionally, Section
22(5) has been interpreted to apply only when a court order issues re-
garding the past due payments. 95 Therefore, this provision is too narrow
to constitute an effective remedy for wrongful denial or termination of
temporary total disability benefits.
Sections 41 and 42 deal with enforcement of permanent disability
awards, attempting to provide assurance of proper payment by the in-
surer.96 Again, these provisions do not apply to all situations which may
employer that conditions exist over which the employer had no control in that either pay-
ments were not made within the prescribed time or the employer denies coverage within
the time specified for the employer to respond.
Id.
94. Section 22 provides only for compensation due "without an award." Although the Attor-
ney General states that an employer is subject to Section 22(5) with or without an award, 79 Op.
Att'y Gen. 285 (1979), the statutory language is specific. Had the legislature intended this section to
be applied to awards, deletion of the phrase "without an award" would have served the purpose.
Insertion of the phrase has the effect of limiting the provision and implies that it was added with that
purpose.
95. 79 Op. Att'y Gen. 285 (1979). This interpretation precludes penalties unless the evidence of
late payments is brought before the court. This would require much more proof on the part of the
claimant and he may consider it not worth the effort. He would have to produce a witness or the
insurance file to document the check dates and the actual dates due. Additionally, for this type of
proof, he would almost certainly have to hire an attorney. Therefore a large amount of misconduct
will never be remedied, at least by Section 22(5).
96. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, §§ 41-42 (1981 & Supp. 1987). Section 41(C) provides as follows:
All payments shall be made on any award in the manner and form prescribed by the Court
not to exceed the weekly rate of compensation specified in Section 22 of this title. ...
Failure for ten (10) days to pay any final award or any portion thereof, as ordered shall
immediately entitle the beneficiary to an order finding the respondent and/or insurance
carrier to be in default and all unpaid portions, including future periodic installments un-
paid, shall immediately become due and may be immediately enforced as provided by Sec-
tion 42 of this title.
Section 42 contains the following provisions:
If payment of compensation or an installment payment of compensation due under the
terms of an award . . . is not made within ten (10) days after the same is due by the
employer or insurance carrier liable therefor, the Court may order a certified copy of the
award to be filed in the office of the court clerk and the county clerk of any county, which
award whether accumulative or lump sum shall be entered on the judgment docket of the
district court, and shall have the same force and be subject to the same law as judgments of
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be encountered during the course of a claim. If, for example, the insurer
continually delays payments for nine days, no remedy would be pro-
vided, nor would there be a payment of interest if the insurer paid prior
to certification by the district court. The language of Section 42 is am-
biguous as to whether this interest applies if the award is paid prior to
certification. Reading Section 42 in conjunction with Section 41 indi-
cates that as a practical matter, interest would not be assessed. The date
on which the award became due would be too uncertain and any attempt
by the claimant to collect interest on a small amount of compensation
would be more than outweighed by the time and effort expended. There-
fore, unless the award is fully certified, this remedy is not practical be-
cause additional litigation would be required to collect the interest.
While Sections 41 and 42 ensure that insurers pay benefits in a
timely manner, they do not provide a remedy for the injured worker.
The ten percent added to overdue temporary disability awards will not,
under current Oklahoma law, be paid to the claimant. Section 101 of the
Act provides that all penalties are to be paid to the court administrator.97
Although it could be argued that this provision should have been re-
pealed and has just been carelessly left on the books, it does remain in
effect.98 Thus, Sections 41 and 42 do not afford the claimant a remedy,
they merely reimburse the Workers' Compensation Court for its time.
Sections 41 and 42 do not contain any penalty provisions. The in-
surer must merely pay interest on the award. While the interest is as-
sessed at a relatively high rate,99 it cannot be construed as a remedy. The
payment of interest compensates the worker only for the use of his
money; it does not provide him a remedy for the bad faith denial of his
claims. The workers' compensation system's failure to provide a remedy
the district court. Any compensation awarded and all payments directed to be made by
order of the Court shall bear interest at the rate of eighteen percent (18%) per year from
the date ordered paid by the Court until the date of satisfaction. . . . If any insurance
carrier intentionally, knowingly, or willfully violates any of the provisions of the Workers'
Compensation Act, the Insurance Commissioner, on the request of a Judge of the Court or
the Administrator, shall suspend or revoke the license or authority of such insurance car-
rier to do a compensation business in the state.
97. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 101 (1981) provides that "[a]ll penalties imposed by the Workers'
Compensation Act, shall be applicable to the expenses of the Administrator. When collected such
penalties shall be paid into the State Treasury and be thereafter appropriated by the Legislature for
the purpose prescribed in this section."
98. This argument would be supported by reference to the 1915 version of Section 42, which
provided a 50% penalty on failure to pay permanent partial disability awards, all of which went to
the administrator. This portion of the provision has since been amended.
99. The statute currently provides interest at 18% per annum, the rate charged by many banks
on credit card balances.
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is a good reason to allow a common law cause of action. °0
3. The Exclusive Remedy Provision
The exclusive remedy provision of the Oklahoma Workers' Com-
pensation Act' 1 ' provides the greatest support for a common law cause
of action for bad faith or intentional infliction of emotional distress. As
previously discussed, either of these causes of actions would be allowed
under Larson's second injury theory."0 2 Even if the Oklahoma courts
reject this theory, however, injured workers should still be able to
recover.
Oklahoma's exclusive remedy provision has been interpreted to
cover only those on-the-job injuries which are accidental. 103 In contrast,
both the torts of bad faith and intentional infliction of emotional distress
require intent on the part of the insurer or employer. Therefore, these
intentional torts are already arguably within the reach of the Oklahoma
plaintiff.
Despite this statutory support, the Larson approach still provides
the strongest argument for allowing a common law cause of action. The
Oklahoma Act provides that injuries covered by the Act must arise "out
of and in the course of employment." The injuries suffered by a claimant
100. Even if these statutory provisions are construed to be penalties, a tort cause of action should
still be allowed. See Coleman v. American Universal Ins. Co., 86 Wis. 2d 615, -, 273 N.W.2d 220,
224 (1979) ("[a] penalty for delayed worker's compensation payments does not preclude a cause of
action for the intentional tort of bad faith for failure to honor or pay the claim").
101. OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 12 (1981 & Supp. 1984). The text of the statute reads as follows:
The liability prescribed in Section 11 of this title shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liability of the employer and any of his employees, any architect, professional engineer, or
land surveyor retained to perform professional services on a construction project, at com-
mon law or otherwise, for such injury, loss of services, or death, to the employee, or the
spouse, personal representative, parents, or dependents of the employee, or any other
person.
The reference Section 11 provides that the employer shall pay compensation benefits for "disability
or death of his employee resulting from an accidental personal injury." Id. at § 11.
102. See supra notes 9, 16-19 and accompanying text.
103. Adams v. Iten Biscuit Co., 63 Okla. 52, 162 P. 938 (1917) addressed the scope of the com-
pensation act and the exclusive remedy provision:
Considering the various provisions of the act together, there does not seem to be any ambi-
guity as to its meaning. It embraces all kinds of accidental injuries not resulting in death,
whether occurring from the negligence of the employer or not arising out of and in the
course of employment, but does not include willful or intentional injuries inflicted by the
employer, nor injuries resulting from an intent upon the part of the employee to injure
himself... . A willful or intentional injury, whether inflicted by the employer or em-
ployee, could not be considered as accidental, and therefore is not covered by the act.
Id. at 60, 162 P. at 945. See also Roberts v. Barclay, 369 P.2d 808 (Okla. 1962) (order sustaining
demurrer to plaintiff's petition affirmed due to lack of proof of intent on part of defendant employer
to cause the injury); Thompson v. Madison Mach. Co., 684 P.2d 565 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984) (cause of
action in tort allowed for employee who was injured in a fight with his employer).
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because of an insurer's bad faith failure to pay or intentional infliction of
emotional distress are clearly not injuries that are covered under the Act.
The second injury caused by the misconduct cannot be covered by the
Act and must therefore be addressed in the district courts.
4. Relationship of the Insurer and Employer
Under Oklahoma case law, the employer and the insurance carrier
are equally immune from suit by the injured worker. 1" A majority of
states with compensation acts routinely make the insurer and employer
immune from suit.1°5 When allowing recovery, courts have avoided the
exclusive remedy provision and held that the misbehaving insurer has
severed itself from the employer and becomes a "third party" who can be
sued.16 This legal fiction is an extension of the dual capacity doctrine
and has been disapproved in most jurisdictions. 0 7 Therefore, jurisdic-
tions following the majority rule afford the protection of the exclusive
remedy statute to the insurer as well as the employer. Oklahoma has
followed suit.
V. CONCLUSION
The Oklahoma courts must allow injured workers to pursue tort
remedies whenever the insurer has acted in bad faith or has intentionally
inflicted emotional distress. Oklahoma recognizes these torts, and
Oklahoma's case law and statutes suggest that such a remedy should be
afforded. While none of the cases decided by Oklahoma courts have
dealt with these torts in the workers' compensation context, the language
of the applicable statutes, and their interpretation by the courts, strongly
suggests that given the opportunity the state courts would allow causes of
action for an insurer's bad faith or intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
104. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Theus, 493 P.2d 433, 435 (Okla. 1972) stated that "it
appears the intent of the Workmen's Compensation Law is to make the insurance carrier one and the
same as the employer as to liability and immunity."
105. See, e-g., Brazier v. Travelers Ins. Co., 602 F. Supp. 541, 544 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (statutory
provision making insurance company and employer one entity as to liability to the worker).
106. The Pennsylvania court put it as follows:
[Tihis conduct is alleged to have occurred outside the workplace, and subsequent to the
initial injury. The insurer was performing "a separate and distinct function... which...
[was] not a part of the employer's business operation."
Thus the court found the insurer was separated from the employer by these acts and subject to
liability. Snyder v. Congoleum/Kinder, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 975, 978 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (citation
omitted).
107. See generally supra note 14 and accompanying text.
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